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I
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jeremy Scruggs (Scruggs) entered a guilty plea to misdemeanor battery on Gooding County
Sherrifrs Deputy Bradley Gennann (Germann) for hitting Gennann's hand and causing Germann
to drop his taser. The Magistrate Court ordered Scruggs to pay restitution for injuries Germann
sustained to his knee after the battery occurred. On appeal the District Court upheld the Magistrate
Court's restitution order. It is from that order this appeal is taken.
On July 17, 2017 a complaint was filed against Scruggs, alleging one misdemeanor count
of battery on a police officer. Specifically, Count I of the Complaint alleged that Scruggs did
''actually, intentionally and unlawfully touch the person of Deputy Bradley Gennann . . . by
pushing Deputy Gennann, and/or knocking Deputy Germann's taser from his hand... ."
On December 4, 2017 Scruggs entered a guilty plea at the pretrial conference to one count
of misdemeanor assault or battery on a police officer. Scruggs admitted on the record to hitting the
tascr out of Germann' s hand but specifically noted he never touched Germann's knee. On January
8, 2018, at the sentencing hearing, Scruggs objected to the amount of restitution being sought by
the state, and the Magistrate Judge set the matter for a restitution hearing.
On February 1, 2018 a restitution hearings was held. At the conclusion of that hearing the
Magistrate Judge found the restitution requested was appropriate and entered an order requiring
Scruggs to pay restitution for Gennann's knee injury.
On March 5, 2018 Scruggs filed an appeal with the District Court asserting the Magistrate
Court abused its discretion when it ordered restitution because the award was not supported by
substantial evidence that there was any economic loss resulting from Scruggs's commission of a
misdemeanor battery on a police officer. The District Court upheld the Magistrate Court's decision,
and this appeal was filed.
At the restitution hearing in front of the Magistrate, Germann testified that he was
dispatched to a fight in the Subway parking lot in Wendell, Idaho. 1 After Germann,s arrival,
Scruggs began running towards Germann,s position, at which point Germann unholstered his taser,
pointed it at Scruggs, and told him to "stop."2 Scruggs then hit Gennann's hand, knocking the
I Restitution Hearing Transcript at 6:3-6.
2 Id. at 6:9-23.
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taser from Gennann's hand. At that point Germann began trying to restrain Scruggs to effect an
arrest.3 Gennann grabbed Scruggs' left hand, and attempted to put it behind Scruggs' back while
attempting to grab Scruggs' other hand to place him into custody. At that point Gennann suffered
a patellar disl0<:ation in his left knee."' Germann testified that at the time of the injury, Scruggs was
pulling away from Oennann as Germann was trying to gain control of Scruggs. 5 Gennann
eventually underwent surgery to fix the dislocated patellar.6
Germann further testified that at the time he was attempting to control Scruggs, the only
place he was touching Scruggs was on his left wrist, and that Scruggs never touched Germann's
knee and never pushed Gennann. 7 Oennann also testified that at the time his knee was injured the
only thing happening was Oennann was trying to gain control of Scruggs by controlling his hands
while Scruggs was pulling away from Germann.8
II

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the District Court err in upholding the order of restitution as consistent with relevant
legal standards and supported by substantial evidence that Oermann's injury resulted from the
criminal conduct to which Scruggs pleaded guilty?
Ill

LEGAL STANDARD
Whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court's discretion
and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7). State v. Wisdom, 161
Idaho 916, 919, 393 P.3d 576,579 (2017). (internal citations omitted). When determining whether
a district court abused its discretion, an appellate court evaluates whether the district court: (1)

3 Id. at 7:3-12.
4 Id. at 7:7-23.
S Id.at7:J7-J9.
6 Id. at 9:4-7.
7 Id.at 10:J0-23.
8 Id. at 16: 12-lS.
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correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with relevant legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Id. (internal citations omitted),
To meet the second and third requirements ofthis analysis, the trial court must base
the amount of restitution upon the preponderance of evidence submitted by the
prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator. Thus, the state must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a causal relationship between the
defendant's criminal conduct and the damages suffered by the victim.
The determination of the amount of restitution, which includes the issue of
causation, is a question of fact for the trial court. The district court's factual findings
with regard to restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion.

State v. Stewart, 161 Idaho 235,236,384 P.3d 999, 1000 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied
(Dec. 12, 2016) (internal citations omitted).

IV
ARGUMENT
DEPUTY GERMANN'S INJURY WAS NOT A RESULT OF THE CRIMINAL CONDUCT
TO WHICH MR. SCRUGGS PLEADED GUILTY
The Magistrate Court's and subsequent District Court's respective decisions were not
supported by substantial evidence or consistent with relevant legal standards and the Order for
Restitution was entered in error. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion. Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 919. In the present case, the
restitution award needs to be supported by substantial evidence, in the record, that economic loss
sustained by the Crime Victims Compensation fund resulted from Scruggs knocking Gennann's
taser from his hand. It is not.
The Idaho restitution statute provides in part:
Unless the court determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or
undesirable, it shall order a defendant found guilty of any crime which results in an
economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the victim. An order ofrestitution
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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... may be complete, partial, or nominal••.. Restitution shall be ordered for any
economic loss which the victim actually suffers....
I.C. § 19-S304(2).
Additionally:
The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of such
restitution, shall consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as
a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the
defendant, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate... .
I.C. § 19-S304(7). (emphasis added).
For a criminal defendant to be held liable for restitutions to a victim, any economic loss
suffered by the victim must have resulted from the criminal act to which the defendant pleaded
guilty. I.C. 19-5304(7), State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689 (Ct. App. 2007). In Shafer,
the defendant collided with another vehicle and left the scene. The victim's car was a total loss
and the victim required medical attention. The defendant eventually pleaded guilty to felony
leaving the scene of an injury accident. The case then proceeded to a status hearing regarding
restitution where the trial court signed an order for restitution for the personal injuries and property
damages suffered by the victim. The defendant then appealed the restitution order. Id. at 371.
The Shafer court held that the trial court had no authority to order restitution in that case
because the victim's losses did not result from the criminal act to which the defendant pleaded
guilty. Id. The court discussed that the defendant's criminal conduct of "leaving the scene and
failing to provide information and assistance did not cause the injuries and property damage
suffered by the other driver." Id. at 373. The court noted that while the elements of leaving the
scene do not require the state to prove injury to the victim, it is possible for a defendant to be held
responsible for restitution in a leaving the scene case, however there was no evidence of such
circumstances presented in that case. Id.
The Shafer court found that "ldaho•s restitution statute clearly pennits restitution orders
only for 'any crime which results in an economic Joss to the victim,,,, Id. at 372. (quoting I.C. 195304(2)). The court held therefore that "except where the parties have consented, a defendant
cannot be required to pay restitution for damages stemming from separate, uncharged and
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unproven crimes." Id. (internal citations omitted).9
In this case Scruggs admitted to hitting the taser out of Germann' s hand when he pleaded
guilty to battery on a police officer. Scruggs never touched Germaru1's knee and never pushed
Gennann while Germann was trying to gain control of him. At the time Germann's knee became
injured, Gennann was behind Scruggs, grabbing Scrugg's hands, and trying to effect an arrest
while Scruggs was pulling away. Scruggs pleaded guilty to battery on a police officer and the act
of battery to which Scruggs admitted was hitting the taser out of Germann' s hand. Germann
testified that at the time his knee was injured, the only thing Scruggs was doing was pulling away
from Germann as he tried to effect an arrest. 10 The only crime that Scruggs could reasonably be
accused of committing during the time Germann's knee was injured would be resisting and
obstructing an officer. Resisting an officer occurs when any person "willfully resists, delays or
obstructs any public officer, in the discharge ... of any duty of his office..." I.C. 18-705.
Scruggs was pulling away from Germann as Gennann was trying to effect an arrest.
Arresting Scruggs for battery on a police officer, for hitting the taser, was within the scope and
discharge ofGermann's official duties at that time. By pulling away, Scruggs was arguably
resisting and/or obstructing Gennann's arrest. It was at this time that Germann injured his knee.
By this point Scruggs' commission of the crime of battery, hitting the taser, was completed and
the crime, if any, occurring at the time of the injury was resisting and/or obstructing an officer.
That crime was never charged by the state, and Gennann's knee injury, if a result of Scrugg's
actions, was a result of Scruggs resisting and/or obstructing Germann. and there is no causal
connection between Scruggs hitting Germann's hand and Germann's knee injury. In this case,
resisting and obstructing an officer is a "separate, uncharged and unproven crime" to which
Scruggs did not pied guilty. Shafer at 372. In accord with Shafer, Scruggs cannot be ordered to
pay restitution as a result of a "separate, uncharged, and unproven crime." Id.
Because Scruggs pleaded guilty to battery on a police officer, this case is factually different
from State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 271 P.3d 1243 (Ct. App. 2012). In Cottrell the defendant
was ordered several times to take his hands out of his pockets and put them behind his back during

an arrest. The defendant failed to comply with the officer's orders and the officer attempted to

9 Eventually the Court of Appeals did uphold the restitution order in Shafer because the defendant had agreed to pay
restitutions as part of the plea agreement, however no such agreement was made in the case at hand.
10 Restitution Hearing Transcript Pg. 16: l2•15.
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force the defendant to place his hands behind his back. During this process the officer twisted his
right knee and suffered a torn lateral meniscus. The defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge
of resisting and obstructing an officer. Id. The defendant was ordered to pay restitution for the
officer's knee injury and appealed the order of restitution, which was upheld.
The key difference between Cottrell and the case at hand is in Cottrell the criminal act to
which the defendant pleaded guilty was the same act that caused the injury and subsequent
economic loss. Id. In Cottrell there was a causal connection between the crime proven and the
economic loss. In the case at hand the crime to which Scruggs pleaded guilty, battery, was
committed and over at the time Gennann injured his knee. At the time Germann injured his knee
Scruggs, actions could only be construed as resisting an arrest. Scruggs pleaded guilty to battery
for hitting the taser and was not charged with resisting arrest; so there is no causal connection
between the crime proven and any economic loss. In Cottrell the defendant was charged with and
pleaded guilty to the crime being committed at the time of the officer's injury, whereas in this case
Scruggs pleaded guilty to a crime that was over at the time of the officer's injury. Co11rell is
factually different from this case and that holding cannot be used to hold Scruggs liable for
restitution in this case. Any economic loss in this case is not causally connected to the criminal act
to which the Scruggs pleaded guilty.
The Cottrell court also discussed the foreseeability of the defendant's conduct of resisting
arrest causing an injury to the officer. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 391-92 (2012). That part of the court's
analysis is not applicable to this case. While Scruggs' actions construed as resisting may have
caused the knee injury, those actions were not charged, nor did Scruggs enter a guilty plea related
to those actions; so the foreseeability of the results of those actions is irrelevant to this case.
Further, while it may be foreseeable that struggling with an officer during an arrest may cause an
officer injury to his knee, it is not foreseeable that knocking a laser from an officer's hand would
cause an injury to the officer's knee. Because of the factual differences between this case and

Cottrell, the Cottrell analysis, including the foreseeability analysis discussed in Cottrell and prior
to that in State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 249 P.3d 398 (2011), should not be considered in the
case at hand.
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V

CONCLUSION
Scruggs pleaded guilty to hitting Germann's taser out of his hand against Gennann's will.
Scruggs did not admit to, nor was he found guilty of pushing Germann or resisting and/or
obstructing Gennann's arrest. The record, when viewed together with relevant precedent, does not
provide substantial evidence that Scruggs' battery on Germann is causally related to any economic
loss for Germann's knee injury. Holding Scruggs liable for such economic loss through a
restitution order is neither consistent with relevant legal standards nor supported by substantial
evidence. Any economic loss arising out of the incident arose out of a separate, uncharged and
unproven crimes. Therefore Mr. Scruggs respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District
Court's decision upholding the Order for Restitution.
DATED this

'2 \ day of November, 2018.

~
..C::f
f
Brendan L. Ash
Gooding County Public Defender
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